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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 17330

-vJOEY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with the crime of
aggravated robbery pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
76-6-302.

§

In a jury trial conducted in the Third Judicial

District Court before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, the
appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of
robbery, a second degree felony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with the aggravated
robbery of a service station attendant by the use of a knife
or facsimile of a knife pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§

76-6-302.

In a jury trial before the Honorable Homer F.

Wilkinson, the appellant was convicted of the lesser included
offense of robbery, a second degree felony, and was sentenced
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to serve a term of confinement at the Utah State Prison of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years.

This sentence

was to be served concurrently with the sentence the appellant
was serving at the time of conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a judgment and order affirming the
appellant's conviction in the lower court,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of Saturday, November 24, 1979,
Mike Weaver was observed shoplifting a leather coat from the
z.c.M.I. store located in the Cottonwood Mall (T 483, 484).
Weaver was arrested, searched, and taken to the store security
office by security personnel where the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office was notified (T. 484).

Deputy John Acomb was

dispatched to pick up weaver and return him to the Holladay
Substation of the sheriff's department (T. 222).

Enroute to

the substation, during a conversation with Weaver, Deputy
Acomb learned that Weaver had been recently paroled from the
Utah State Prison (T. 223).

Apprehensive about returning to

the prison as a result of the shoplifting charge, Weaver
expressed the desire to cooperate with authorities to prevent
a robbery or apprehend the participants of a robbery which was
already scheduled to occur later that evening (T. 223, 291).

-2-
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During the interview with sheriff's deputies, Weaver noted
that the appellant had called him earlier in the day wanting
to commit an armed robbery and to discuss plans for the
robbery that evening (T. 143-145).

Weaver, a proven reliable

police informant, then consented to call the appellant from
the police station and further discuss plans for the robbery
(T. 313, 314, 144).

During this recorded conversation, Weaver

and the appellant discussed the vehicle and weapons to be
used, as well as the types of victims who were the easiest
targets (T. 144, 445).

As a result of the conversation, it

was determined that no firearms would be used, that Weaver
would use his vehicle to pick up the appellant at his parents'
address, and that the robbery would be perpetrated (T. 19, 20,
316).
Before Weaver left the police substation to drive
to the appellant's residence, officers instructed him to
prevent any threat to life at all costs (T. 21).

Police

officers also instructed Weaver to drive straight through a
designated intersection if the robbery had taken place, or to
turn at that intersection if the crime had not been committed
(T. 100).

At the conclusion of these instructions, weaver we

then released to drive to another meeting point where police
would give him final instructions (T. 100).

Weaver was told

to abort the robbery if a firearm was involved, and if
possible, to inform the police when the location of the
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robbery became known to him (T. 166).

Weaver was also

instructed that in order to keep his identity as an informer
secret, he would be allowed to escape on foot after the
vehicle was stopped by police (T. 21).

Weaver then proceeded

to drive to the address given him by the appellant during the
earlier telephone conversation (T. 167).
Upon picking up the appellant, weaver noticed that
Williams had brought a household paring knife to be used as a
weapon (T. 22).

Weaver and the appellant proceeded to drive

around in search of a place to rob (T. 23).

This search led

them to Holiday Oil, a service station located approximately
two miles from appellant's residence (T. 23, 27).

Weaver and

the appellant arrived at the station just as the attendant was
preparing to close the business (T. 83).

As the attendant

returned from emptying the garbage, the appellant approached
him at the door of the station and informed him that "my
partner has a gun and this is a holdup"

(T. 83).

The

attendant was uncertain that a gun was actually involved (T.
89).

The three men then entered the station where the

attendant was forced to sit in a chair while the appellant
took the attendant's wallet and money from the cash register
(T. 86, 280, 297).

The appellant and Weaver then exited the

station area, entered their car, and sped away (T. 88, 170).
A

short time later, a police surveillance vehicle observed
-4-
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Weaver's automobile travel straight through the designated
intersection, indicating that the robbery had taken place (T.
106).

The officers pursued the vehicle which eventually

pulled to the side of the road and stopped (T. 107).

As

Weaver stopped the car, he jumped out and escaped on foot as
planned (T. 107).

The appellant was apprehended and taken

back to the service station where the attendant identified him
as one of the robbers (T. 90, 91).
At trial, Mike Weaver testified that he was
returned to the prison in July of 1980 for violating his
parole (T. 28-29).

While there, weaver was approached and

threatened by the appellant on several occasions (T. 29, 32).
At one point, Weaver was beaten by unidentified assailants (T.
33).

The appellant also coerced weaver into signing a hand-

written statement saying in effect that Weaver had committed
the robbery by himself and that the appellant was only a
hitchhiker who was picked up just prior to the commission of
the crime (T. 32-34).

weaver also testified that defense

counsel and an investigator employed by counsel presented him
with a typewritten statement for his signature (T. 34-35).
This statement was presented to Weaver at the prison without
the knowledge or approval of the prosecutor, and in the
absence of a certified shorthand reporter (T. 35, 42-43).
the time this statement was signed, Weaver did not have the
-5-
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At

benefit of counsel, nor was he placed under oath (T. 35, 43).
weaver was also not allowed to keep a copy of the statement
(T. 39-40).

Later, because of the threats and the coercive

environment to which Weaver was subjected, he was granted
protective custody (T. 36, 128, 209, 221).
In his opening statement at the trial, the
prosecutor noted that while Weaver had been incarcerated in
the State Prison, he had been threatened by several inmates
including the appellant (T. 7).

He also noted that because of

this precarious position, Weaver was coerced into signing a
statement exculpating the appellant from criminal liability
(T. 7).

The prosecutor stated further that Weaver would

testify to the signing of the statement which was in the
custody of defense counsel (T. 7).

Defense counsel interposed

no contemporaneous objection, and in fact did not mention the
prosecutor's opening statement until some time later, prior to
the cross examination of weaver (T. 41).
At that time, out of the presence of the jury,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial, not on the ground that
counsel's integrity had been impugned, but on the ground that
the prosecutor, through his opening statement and through the
direct examination of Weaver, had informed the jury that the
appellant had been previously convicted of a felony (T. 42).
The court thereafter reconvened in chambers to discuss the
-6-
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matter further, and eventually denied the motion for a
mistrial (T. 44).

In chambers, defense counsel made his first

motion to withdraw as counsel on the ground that he was so
upset he could not continue to competently represent the
appellant (T. 44).
withdraw (T. 45).

The court likewise denied ·the motion to
The trial proceeded in normal fashion (T.

4 5- 46 ) •

The second day of the trial, September 8, 1980,
began with the trial judge excusing the jury in order to hear
a series of defense motions (T. 118).

Defense counsel moved

for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor "introduced
evidence" in his opening statement (T. 118).

This alleged

"incompetent evidence" was purported to be the prosecutor's
comment made during his opening statement that Weaver had
signed a statement under duress and coercion, exculpating the
appellant, which statement was in the custody of defense
counsel (T. 119).

Defense counsel then asserted that he

should be allowed to withdraw as counsel on the grounds that
his character had been discredited (T. 121).

He alleged that

his credibility could be restored only if he were able to call
the

p~osecutor

himself,

to testify and withdraw as defense

c~~~"

0

~

in order to testify to the events surrounding the

signing of the statement by Weaver at the prison (T. 123-124),
Defense counsel concluded his argument by again moving for a
-7-
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mistrial on the ground that his client could not obtain a fair
trial (T. 126).

After a brief response by the prosecutor, the

court, referring to a meeting held in chambers on the subject,
denied the motion for a mistrial (T. 129).
On the subject of calling the prosecutor as a
defense witness and allowing defense counsel to withdraw and
likewise become a defense witness, defense counsel stated
expressly that he was not going to testify (T. 125).

The

court thereafter denied defense counsel's request to call the
prosecutor as a witness when the prosecutor objected on the
grounds of relevancy (T. 136).

Defense counsel also noted

that a curative instruction may be required concerning the
"inadmissible evidence" mentioned in the prosecutor's opening
statement (T. 132).

The court replied that such an

instruction would be given upon counsel's request; however, no
such instruction was ever requested (T. 132-133).
Later in the trial, after the State had rested its
case, the defense called weaver as a witness (T. 202).
Defense counsel questioned Weaver in depth about prior felony
convictions (T.

203-209).

During this time, defense counsel

elicited information concerning crimes with which Weaver was
charged but which were never brought to trial, and for which
no conviction was obtained (T. 208).

The entire line of

questioning took place over the prosecutor's continuing
objection (T. 206-207).
-8-
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Therafter, defense counsel called and examined
witness James Miller (T. 219).

During direct examination, the

witness testified that he was currently a resident of the Utah
State Prison, having been convicted of robbery and kidnapping
(T. 219-220).

On cross examination, the witness was asked

"What did you rob?"

(T. 222).

Defense counsel objected to the

question stating that the prosecutor was entitled to ask only
the nature and year of the conviction (T. 222).

The

prosecutor responded to the objection by moving to strike the
previous improper examination of Weaver concerning previous
charges and convictions, which was allowed pursuant to a side
bar stipulation (T. 222).

The prosecutor also observed that

the defense counsel, by the improper examination of Weaver,
had "opened the door respecting the parameters" of
(T. 222).

questioni~

The court overruled the objection and the witness

replied that he had beaten two persons and had taken their
driver's licenses and one of their wallets (T. 222).

The

prosecutor then asked the witness who he had kidnapped (T.
222).

The witness replied that he had kidnapped an eleven-

year-old child (T. 223).

Although no contemporaneous

objection was made to this question, an objection was
interposed to a later question asking why the witness had
committed the crime (T. 223).

The witness refused to answer

the question stating that the reason for the kidnapping was
"beside the point" (T. 223).
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Beginning the third day Of trial, the court
convened in chambers and discussed the matter of the
parameters of the direct and cross examination of witnesses
who had been convicted of felonies (T. 350).

The prosecutor

asked that the record reflect the contents of a discussion
that took place at the side bar (T. 350).

After brief

comments were heard as to the contents of the side bar
discussion,

the court summarized the discussion for the

record:
And after the discussion we concluded
that the Court was of the opinion that
the examination by the defense was going
beyond the scope permitted.
That the
State stipulated to it, and I believe I
stated that on the record, the State
agreed to it.
But with the understanding
that if you did go into it the door would
be open and the State could also have the
same latitude.
That is my best
recollection.
(T. 353).

The court then allowed the prosecutor to call a

rebuttal witness before counsel's arguments began (T. 354).
Immediately prior to allowing counsel to argue their cases,
and prior to giving the instructions to the jury, the court
noted that the evidence had been completed (T. 357).

The

court then reiterated a note previously stated to the jury
that counsel's arguments were not evidence, but rather
constituted their attempt to tie the evidence together under
their particular point of view (T. 357).
-10-
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During the prosecutor's argument, reference was
made to "what the impact would have been had Mr. Cassins Clart
himself been injured"

(T. 361).

Although an objection to this

comment was interposed, the court overruled the objection
stating that the comment was proper under the offense charged

(T. 361).
After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict,
finding the appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of
robbery (T. 367).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REFERENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS
OPENING STATEMENT TO THE FACT THAT
DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD CUSTODY OF A
STATEMENT SIGNED BY THE STATE'S CHIEF
WITNESS EXCULPATING THE APPELLANT FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WAS PROPER WHERE THE
WITNESS WAS EXPECTED TO TESTIFY
CONCERNING THE STATEMENT, THE REFERENCE
WAS MADE IN GOOD FAITH, AND NO PREJUDICE
RESULTED FROM THE COMMENT.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor
commented:
Bear in mind, also, that Mr. weaver
was brought from the State Prison this
morning, and will return to prison at the
-11-
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conclusion of this case.
Bear in mind,
also, that while Mr. Weaver was
incarcerated at the State Prison, he was
in a rather precarious situation since he
is now a state witness.
He has had
several threats made to him from prison
inmates, including Mr. Williams, who
threatened him if he was to testify.
He
was at one point coerced into signing a
statement which would indicate that Mr.
Williams was not involved in the crime.
Bear in mind that he did that under
duress and coercion at the time because
of the circumstance he was in.
He will
testify to the fact that he did sign this
particular statement.
This statement at
the present time is in custody of defense
counsel, and I have nothing previous to
that statement at this point in time.
(T. 7).

Defense counsel interposed no contemporaneous

objection to the above comment he now assails.

At the end of

the opening statement, defense counsel noted that he had a
motion to make out of the presence of the jury, but would
reserve it for a later, more convenient time (T. 11).

After

direct examination of Weaver, the motion was heard out of the
presence of the jury.

Counsel moved for a mistrial on the

ground that the prosecutor "in both his opening statement and
through the testimony of Mr. warner, has elicited evidence now
before the jury that Mr. Williams was in prison at the time
the relationship [between Weaver and Williams] was first
formed (T. 41).

In response, the prosecutor noted that since

a notice of entrapment had been filed by the appellant,
appellant's relationship to Weaver and the fact that appellant
-12-
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was on a work release program at the time of the robbery were
certainly relevant (T. 42).

It was not until this point, out

of the presence of the jury, that counsel took offense to the
prosecutor's response to his (defense counsel's) motion for a
mistrial which had absolutely no connection with the alleged
"attack" on the integrity of appellant's counsel in the
prosecutor's opening statement, and which was no more than an
appropriate comment on the anticipated testimony of the
prosecutor's own witness.

Counsel then moved for permission

to withdraw from the case on the ground that becauEe he was
emotionally upset, he could not effectively represent his
client (T. 44).

The court denied both the motion for mistrial

and the motion to withdraw (T. 44-45).
Not only did appellant fail to contemporaneously
object to the prosecutor's comment, he also failed to object
when the circumstances surrounding the signing of the
statement were elicited on direct examination of Mr. Weaver
(T. 34-36, 39-40).

The only objections interposed at all

during this line of questioning were:

1) to the witness'

conclusion as to why he was asked to sign the statement
(objection sustained); and 2) to the witness' comment as to
what the public defender's investigator asked him to de
(objection sustained)

(T. 39).

Again, at no point did the

appellant object to the opening comments of the prosecutor or
the
-13-
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testimony by Weaver concerning the statement signed by Weaver
at the prison on the grounds asserted in appellant's brief.
The only two objections interposed at all were sustained on
the grounds of conclusiveness of the answer and hearsay (T.
39-40).

Furthermore, when appellant's counsel moved for a

mistrial, the basis asserted then was far removed from the
alleged basis proffered in appellant's brief.

In such a case,

appellant cannot be heard to complain on different grounds on
appeal.

In the case of State v. Long, 580 P.2d 1181, 1182

(Ariz. 1978), the Arizona Supreme Court was faced with an
allegation of error committed in one of the trial court's jury
instructions.

At trial the defendant objected to the

instruction on grounds different from those urged on appeal.
Discussing the doctrine of waiver in this context, the court
stated:
However, raising one objection at trial
does not preserve another objection on
appeal • • • • Furthermore, an error in
giving instructions is waived unless
timely objection is made in the trial
court • • • • Because appellant failed to
raise the objection at trial that she now
urges on appeal, the objection is waived.
Any comment by the prosecutor which could be
construed as an affront to counsel's integrity only by the
wildest stretch of the imagination occurred in chambers or in
the courtroom out of the presence of the jury.

The appellant

thereby suffered absolutely no prejudice.
-14-
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The result of appellant's failure to appropriately
and contemporaneously object to the comments and rulings he
now alleges were erroneous and prejudicial is a waiver of the
right to present those issues to this Court.

Such objections

are required to properly preserve issues for appeal.

See

Ru~

4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 46 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Failure to properly preserve issues for

appeal requires the operation of the doctrine of waiver as
subscribed to by this Court in Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968
(Utah 1968), and more recently in Andrews v. Morris, Utah, 607
P.2d 816 (1980) and Pierre v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 812
(1980).

The appellant compounded this waiver by failing to

request any type of curative instruction.

This failure, in

itself, requires a ruling that the appellant has waived the
issue on appeal.

The court, in People v. Beivelman, 447 P.2d

913, 921 (Cal. 1968), stated with respect to improper remarks
in opening statements, improper examination, or improper
argument, that "Hence, if he [the defendant]

is silent or

merely objects or makes the assignment of misconduct but did
not request an admonition, he cannot complain on appeal."

In

the present case, the appellant almost met this burden, but~
the end failed to request any type of curative admonition
though the Court offered to give such an instruction.
-15-
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ev~

Mr. Bugden:

We are going to have to get a curative
instruction as to the inadmissible evidence
that is before the Court.

The Court:

If you request the instruction.

I would

indicate to you I think it is very unwise.
think it is unnecessary.

I

But if you requested

it I would probably give it just because you
asked for it.
(T. 132-133).

Appellant's counsel failed to take advantage of

the court's offer by omitting any request for an instruction.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the
waiver doctrine will not be allowed to operate where an
appellant demonstrates "cause" for his failure to comply with
a state's procedural rule and actual prejudice resulting from
the alleged error.

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

The appellant demonstrates neither cause nor actual prejudice.
Certainly, since counsel was present with the appellant at all
times during the trial, there can be no reason for the failure
to contemporaneously object.

Likewise, because of the quality

and quantity of evidence, as well as the fact that the
appellant admitted committing the robbery (T. 277), no
miscarriage of justice and consequently no prejudice resulted
from the failure to object in a timely manner.

See United

States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979).
-16-
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On September 8, 1980, court convened for the second
day of trial.

The jury was again excused in order for

appellant's counsel to present several motions (T. 118).

At

that time, appellant renewed his motion for a new trial on the
basis that the prosecutor introduced "incompetent evidence" in
his opening statement, and accused appellant's counsel of
"tampering with a witness" (T. 119).

In response, the

prosecutor noted that:
I don't recall anything in the opening
statement that I in any way besmirched
Mr. Bugden.
I certainly have the right
to refer to evidence solicited.
I don't
have to sit around here and wait for
defense counsel to spring a surprise
statement on me with respect to a case,
particularly when I have information that
has been made available to me just prior
to coming in here [to trial) that
indicates that Mr. Weaver did make a
statement that is inconsistent.
0

(T. 127).

The court correspondingly denied the motion for a

mistrial stating:
The court does deny the motion as far as
a mistrial is concerned.
The court
doesn't want to make further comment
except this, that we discussed this
matter last Friday, the court knows what
was said, and I say knows, I recall
somewhat.
I do not feel there is
anything on the record there that is
prejudicial as far as the character of
defense counsel anyway, and I denied the
motion last Friday.
There is nothing new
before me today to make me change my
mind.
And I again deny the motion.
(T.

130).

-17-
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A review of the comment made in the opening statement by the
prosecutor supports the comments made by the court in denying
the motion for mistrial and the prosecutor's response to the
motion.

At no time was counsel's name mentioned, nor was

there mention of any impropriety or unethical. conduct on
behalf of appellant's counsel.

Any possible suggestions of

impropriety occurred out of the presence of the jury or in
chamber consultations during recesses.
Furthermore, case law overwhelmingly supports the
view that the appellant cannot prevail on this point.

Since

the opening statement is essentially an outline of the
information and evidence which counsel will present in support
of his case, at the time an opening statement is given, no
facts have been proven and no rulings on the admissibility of
evidence have been made.

Therefore, it is a widely accepted

practice that "Counsel may state what he expects the witness
will testify if the witness is going to testify."
State, 225 S.E. 2d 705, 707 (Ga. App. 1976).

Hall v.

This follows

closely the reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas
which stated:
This court has consistently held that a
prosecuting attorney is allowed
reasonable latitude in stating to the
jury the facts he proposes to prove ••.•
It is only when the prosecutor acts in
bad faith and substantial prejudice
results that appellate courts act.
State v. Jackson, Kan., 565 P.2d 278, 284 (1977).
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Correspondingly, the controlling rule was stated by the court
in the case of Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.
1968).

There the court was faced with a situation where the

prosecutor in his opening statement commented in considerable
detail on the evidence he intended to present and the
witnesses who would testify to that evidence.

In one ins ta nee

he named a witness who was expected to testify to the
commission of the crime, and thereafter recited what the
testimony would be.

When the witness was eventually

called~

the stand, he refused to answer the prosecutor's questions
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination.

On appeal,

the court rejected appellant's claim of prejudicial error
resulting from the prosecutor's opening statement by holding
that:
The controlling question should be the
good faith or lack of good faith of
counsel in saying what he said in his
opening statement and the likelihood that
the opening statement was unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant.
388 F.2d at 779.

In the instant case, not only did the

prosecutor make proper mention in his opening statement of the
testimony he expected from a named witness, but the testimony
expected was actually produced without any contemporaneous
objection made by appellant's counsel.

Furthermore,

appellant's counsel was afforded unlimited cross examination
-19-
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of the witness, Mr. Weaver, and later called him as a witness
for the defense.

Consequently, the appellant was in no way

prejudiced by the prosecutor's comment in his opening
statement.
Moreover, since the testimony given by Weaver
concerned only the physical and emotional environment of
duress surrounding the signing of the statement, introduction
of the statement itself was not necessary in order to make the
prosecutor's comment proper.

However, even if introduction of

the statement had been necessary, the comment would still have
been proper.

In the case of Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d

1083, 1085 (10th Cir. 1968), the court stated:
Appellant moved for a mistrial contending
that the evidence did not sustain a
prejudicial opening statement made by the
government.
The law does not require
that opening trial statements be
completely supported by evidence
introduced at trial.
Such a rule,
rigidly enforced, would effectively
eliminate opening remarks and deprive the
jury of a very useful outline of the
trial as the attorneys expect it to
unfold • . • • The decision is
discretionary and is for the trial judge.
In adopting the above rationale, the Supreme Court of Colorado
stated in People v. Jacobs, Colo., 499 P.2d 615 (1972) that:
-20-
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We adhere to the general rule that error
cannot ordinarily be predicated upon an
opening statement of the prosecuting
attorney as to what he expects to prove,
where, for some reason he later fails to
support some part of that statement,
unless the unsupported portion of this
statement was made in bad faith and was
manifestly prejudicial. •
Thus,
absent an affirmative showing of
prejudice as bad faith on the part of
counsel making the statement, the
decision of the trial judge controlling
such remarks will not ordinarily be
disturbed.
499 P.2d at 617.

While the appellant has not shown the

prosecutor's remark to be improper or prejudicial, and no
showing of bad faith has been made, should this Court find
error, the error was cured by the trial court's admonitions
and instructions to the jury.
Immediately prior to instructing the jury on the
applicable law and after both parties had rested their cases,
the court noted:
At this time, members of the jury, that
does complete the evidence in the case,
and as I indicated to you last night it
now becomes the Court's responsibility to
instruct you on the law in this matter,
after which both counsel will have an
opportunity to argue the law and the
facts to you, the purpose of that
argument being to persuade you as far as
their position is concerned.
And of
course, as I stated at the outset, what
they say is not evidence, but they will
tie the evidence together to give you
information as to their particular view.
-21-
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(T. at 357)

(emphasis added).

Although the court made this

statement with particular reference to the closing arguments
of counsel, the inference communicated by the court is that at
some earlier point in time, probably at the beginning of
trial, a similar admonition was given.

In further

amelioration of any error, the court made appropriate mention
of the law and procedure of the admitting of evidence, and the
jury's role in the trial.

In instruction number six, the

court recited that:
You are not to consider any evidence
offered but not admitted, nor any
evidence stricken out by the court; as to
any question to which an objection was
sustained, you must not conjecture as to
what the answer might have been or as to
the reason for the objection.
(R. 90).

In instructions numbers nine and ten, the court

stated among other things that the jury was the exclusive
finder of fact and weigher of the evidence (R. 93, 94).

Such

instructions and admonitions were more than sufficient to
render harmless any alleged impropriety in the opening
statement.
The court, in State v. Bowie, 580 P.2d 1190, 1194
(Ariz. 1978), concurred with this point of view.
case, the prosecutor,

In that

in his opening statement, described the

defendant's lewd and lascivious acts committed against a
-22-
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four-year-old victim.
incompetent to testify.

Later, this victim was found to be
The appellant moved for a mistrial ~

the basis of alleged prejudice resulting from evidence
described in the statement but not produced at trial.
Regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that:
Any possible prejudice from the opening
statement was overcome by the court's
cautionary instructions that evidence did
not come from the attorneys and that the
verdict must be determined only by
reference to the evidence.
The two cases referred to by appellant in support
of his cause are either inapposite to, and distinguishable
from, the instant case, or supportive of the respondent's
view.

In Woodmansee v. Stoneman, 344 A.2d 26 (Vt. 1975), the

defense objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of prior
consistent statements which were outlined in the prosecutor's
opening statement.

On appeal, the state argued the propriety

of the statements' admission on the ground that prior
consistent statements are admissible where a witness has been
impeached.

In the present case, no prior consistent

statements were used or mentioned.

Also, unlike Woodmansee,

no contemporaneous objections were interposed.
In Baker v. State, 33 N.W. 52 (Wis. 1887), the
appellant's conviction was affirmed after the court noted
-23-
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that counsel should be given broad latitude in their
statements, and where questions arise, the trial court's
discretionary ruling is respected absent any abuse of
discretion.
In the present case, the record reveals that the
comment made by the prosecutor with respect to the fact that a
statement was signed by witness Weaver in reality contained no
reference to appellant's counsel, and in no way impugned the
credibility of counsel.

Moreover, complaints of the appellant

are not properly before this Court where the appellant failed
to contemporaneously object in the lower court on the grounds
presented in this appeal.

Furthermore, the appellant makes no

demonstration of actual prejudice resulting from the comment.
The discussions and motions for mistrial were heard outside
the presence of the jury.

In the absence of any reference to

appellant's counsel's name or insinuation of a lack of
integrity,

it cannot be assumed that prejudice resulted.
Likewise, the comment cannot be viewed as the

introduction of incompetent evidence.

The comment contained

no reference to the processes or manner by which the statement
was obtained, nor was any reference made to the language of
the statement.

The comment, which simply mentioned the

statement in passing, was well within the realm of proper
comment by the prosecutor who is allowed wide latitude in
-24-
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outlining the witnesses and their expected testimony to the
members of the jury panel.
alone or unsupported.

Nor was the comment left to stand

During direct examination, witness

Weaver testified to the environment of duress at the prison
which resulted in the signing of the statement.

Moreover,

Weaver was subject to a full and rigorous period of cross
examination.

In view of this entire courtroom scenario, the

appellant was not in any way prejudiced by this occurrence
properly commented upon by the prosecutor.
POINT II
SINCE THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE IN HIS
OPENING STATEMENT TO AN INCONSISTENT
STATEMENT SIGNED BY THE STATE'S CHIEF
WITNESS DID NOT DISCREDIT DEFENSE
COUNSEL, THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO TESTIFY
AND TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTOR TO TESTIFY,
WHERE THE PROFFERED TESTIMONY COULD HAVE
BEEN OBTAINED FROM OTHER PERSONS.
In responding to Points II and III of appellant's
brief, it is important to note the comment made by the
prosecutor in his opening statement, which is proffered as the
basis of appellant's allegations.
He has had several threats made to him
from prison inmates including Mr.
Williams who threatened him if he was to
testify.
He was at one point in time
coerced into signing a statement which
-25-
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would indicate that Mr. Williams was not
involved in a crime.
Bear in mind that
he did that under duress and coercion at
the time because of the circumstance he
was in.
He will testify to the fact that
he did sign this particular statement.
This statement at the present time is in
the custody of defense counsel, anQ I
have nothing previous to that statement
at this point in time.
(T. 7).

At no time is the name of appellant's counsel

mentioned, nor is there any allegation of impropriety on the
part of counsel in the manner by which the statement was
obtained.

Likewise, no mention is made of counsel's

investigator nor of visits made to the prison.

It is

important to remember also that the witness, weaver, testified
in support of the above comment without objection from
appellant's counsel.

Note also that counsel conducted cross

examination of the witness and introduced witnesses to counter
Weaver's testimony.

In view of these facts, it was simply

unnecessary for appellant's counsel or the prosecutor to
withdraw and testify in the case, particularly where no
contemporaneous objection on the grounds now alleged was made
either during the opening statement or direct examination.
The first reference made to a motion to withdraw is
found during the discussion of a motion for a mistrial out of
the presence of the jury (T. 44).

There, appellant's counsel

moves to withdraw on the basis that he could no longer
-26-
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effectively represent his client; he makes no mention of
withdrawing in order to testify.

After the motion was denied,

appellant's counsel conducted the cross examination of several
witnesses.

Not until the second day of the trial, four days

after the first day of trial, did counsel move to withdraw on
the grounds now asserted.

At that time, counsel also

expressed his intention to call the prosecutor as a defense
witness (T. 121).

In response to counsel's motion, the court

stated:
I don't think there is a need for either
one of you testifying.
I think all you
are doing, Mr. Bugden, to be perfectly
frank with you, is stirring this matter
up and creating a want for something
there that is just not there.
There has
not been the prejudice on this record of
which you are referring to.
(T. 132).

Appellant's counsel later disposed of the present

issue in a colloquy with the court:
The Court:

That is my understanding.

So i f you call yourself

as a witness, then you are doing that of your own
choice.
Mr. Bugden: Well, I am doing it because the Court won't
declare a mistrial.
The Court:

No you are not.
witness.

You are calling yourself as a

What you are saying is that you will

not argue the case,

is that correct counsel?

-27-
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Mr. Bugden:

Well, that is what the canons require.

The court:

Well,

then I want to get this clear.

rs that

what you intend to not argue the case?
Mr. Bugden:

I

haven't decided, Your Honor, if r am going

to testify.

I

have decided that Mr. Christensen

is.
The court:

My question to you is this--

Mr. Bugden:

I am not going to testify.

(T. 135)

(Emphasis added).

Simply stated, there was no reason

for the court to allow appellant's counsel to withdraw in
order to testify since appellant's counsel had decided not to
testify.

This issue was rendered moot by appellant's counsel

in the lower court.
Courts in general are hesitant to allow
participating counsel to be called as a witness since "The
role of advocate and witness should be kept separated and an
advocate should be called as a witness only in circumstances
of the utmost necessity."
P.2d 475, 478 (1978).
present case.

Cavaness v. State, Okl. Cir., 581

Such necessity did not exist in the

It is important to note that the details of the

signing of the statement by Weaver and the alleged
insinuations of misconduct were never presented to the jury.
Had the jury been informed of the manner in which the
statement was obtained by defense counsel, the necessity of

-28-
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further evidence of the details and telephone conversations
might be arguable.

However, even in that event, the testimony

of either counsel would not have been required.

Appellant's

counsel could easily have called as a witness the
who actually obtained the statement (T. 119).

investiga~r

Counsel could

also have called John Hill, who was also apparently connected
with the signing of the statement (T. 121).

As to any

information concerning Weaver's initial contact with counsel
and Weaver's prison status at the time of the contact, Weaver
himself could have testified to those events on direct
examination by appellant's counsel.

As to Weaver's prison

status at the time of initial contact, Beverly Tisher,
custodian of prison records, could have provided the necessary
testimony.

All of the necessary information could have been

obtained without the testimony of the prosecutor or the
appellant's counsel.
In the present case, counsel's proffered showing of
the necessity of calling the prosecutor as a defense witness
was insufficient to compel the court to rule in counsel's
favor over the objection of the prosecutor.

In Riboni v.

District Court in and for the Tenth Judicial District, Colo.,
586 P.2d (1978), the court held that:

-29-
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To disqualify a prosecuting
attorney, the defendant has the burden of
establishing facts sufficient to persuade
the trial court that he probably will be
denied a fair trial if the prosecuting
attorney is not removed . • • • The mere
fact that the defense intends to call the
prosecutor as a witness does not, without
more, dispose of the question.
586 P.2d at 11.

In the present case, the appellant has not

even approached this level of proof.

Indeed, it is difficult

to imagine how the appellant was denied a fair trial in view
of his admission that he committed the robbery:
Mr. Bugden:

You did the robbery, didn't you?

Mr. Williams:

Yeah.

Yes, I did.

(T. 277).

The Court, in Riboni. also stated the reason for
its holding was that:
Every prosecutor who participates
directly in interviewing and otherwise
investigating his cases subjects himself
to the risk of being called as a witness.
But to allow opposing counsel the
unfettered option of removing any
prosecutor who has personal knowledge of
any material fact in the case might well
result in restricting the prosecution
function to the ill-prepared.
586 ?.2d at 11.

Since no "material fact" was involved in the

present case, the above stated reason looms as a more ominous
danger.
-30-
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Not only must the appellant demonstrate that he
will be denied a fair trial in order to prevail, his burden

is

compounded by the fact that the issue is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.

In State v. Hegervorst, 566

P.2d 828 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977), the court stated:
Nevertheless, a trial court has
discretion respecting the examination of
witnesses and, in appropriate
circumstances, may refuse to allow a
witness to take the stand.
courts are
reluctant to allow attorneys to be called
as witnesses in trials in which they are
advocates.
When a trial court refuses to
allow a prosecutor to be called as a
witness for the defense, the appellate
issue is whether the trial court abused
its discretion.
566 P.2d at 834.

In light of the fact that the evidence

sought to be obtained from the prosecutor's testimony could
have been obtained from a number of other individuals, it
cannot be said that the lower court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow appellant's counsel to call the prosecutor
as a witness.

Likewise, it is clear that where evidence of

the details of the signing of the statement were not before
the jury, the appellant was not denied his right to the
confrontation of witnesses under Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution.
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POINT III
WHERE THE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S GUILT
WAS OVERWHELMING, HE HAS FAILED TO
OVERCOME HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXERCISE SOUND
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO
ASK QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRIOR FELONY
CONVICTIONS OF A WITNESS WHO WAS NOT THE
DEFENDANT, PARTICULARLY WHERE SUCH
QUESTIONING WAS STIPULATED TO, AND OPENED
BY APPELLANT'S COUNSEL.
Appellant complains in Point IV of his brief that
the prosecutor's cross examination of witness James Miller was
improper and constituted reversible error.

On direct

examination, appellant's counsel asked Miller where he
resided,

for what crimes he had been convicted, and in what

year he was convicted (T. 219-220).

The witness answered that

he had been convicted of robbery and kidnapping (T. 220).

On

cross examination, the prosecutor asked the witness what he
robbed, beginning the following colloquy:
By Mr. Christensen:

What did you rob?

Mr. Bugden:

He is not entitled to ask that question.

Mr. Christensen:

I am if he is, Your Honor.

Mr. Bugden:

He is entitled to ask the nature of the
conviction, the year of the conviction.

Mr. Christensen:

I move to strike every bit of Mr.
weaver's testimony.

I indicate Mr.

Bugden has opened the door respecting
parameters of this.
-32-
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The Court:
(T. 222).

The Court would overrule the objection.

The witness continued on to answer that he had

beaten two persons and had taken their wallets (T. 222).

The

witness later responded concerning the kidnapping conviction
that he had kidnapped an eleven-year-old child (T. 223).

It

is notable that no objection was made to the questioning about
the kidnapping until the witness was asked why he committed
the crime (T. 222-223).

Also interesting to note is the

prosecutor's response to the objection (T. 222).

The

prosecutor moved to strike Weaver's testimony elicited on
direct examination by appellant's counsel (T. 222).

Also, the

prosecutor indicated that appellant's counsel had opened the
parameters of the questioning (T. 222).

A closer scrutiny of

the grounds for these comments reveals justification
overlooked by the appellant.
An analysis of appellant's counsel's direct
examination of Weaver shows that the questioning was conducted
for the sole purpoe of impeaching Weaver's credibility.
During this examination, appellant's counsel paraded before
the jury allegations of charges that the witness had no
knowledge of, or that were dismissed prior to trial (T. 205,
208).

Such improper questioning was allowed to continue

throughout direct examination, over the state's objection, a~
was the object of the prosecutor's response that if
-33-
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appellant was allowed such questioning, he should be afforded
the same latitude.

Further light is shed on this entire issue

by a colloquy which took place during the last day of trial.

Mr. Christensen:

[A]lso there was an objection that the State
made.
I am trying to recall exactly what
the wording of it was.
Oh, yes, dealing
with the parameters of cross-examination,
or direct examination of a witness who
takes the stand and has been convicted of a
felony.
At that time I objected to Mr. Bugden's
broad latitude and broad questioning and
going beyond the scope of the statute in
asking questions that were not relative or
probative to either impeachment or credibility of the witness, and under the statute
to avoid embarrassment to a witness.
There
are certain parameters that must be
governed.
I believe my objection was based upon Mr.
Bugden's going beyond that, and that this
necessitated me to go beyond the parameters
in cross-examining his witness.
As we
indicated in the side bar, Mr. Bugden may be
opening the door to broader discovery and
broader examination than he is entitled to
under the statute.

(T. 350-351).

After a brief response by appellant's counsel,

the prosecutor replied:

Mr. :hristensen:

You recall that this is not the side bar
conference I am talking about.
Your Honor,
I am talking about the one where Mr. Weaver
was being inquired as to the details of his
felony offenses, as to the details what had
taken place, talking about guns and
possession of the gun.
At this time I objected to his going beyond
the scope of the statute in asking those
-34-
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particular questions.
And again questions
came up when he started referring to
complaints which Mr. Weaver was never even
convicted with regard to inquiry.
(T. 352).

The court then summarized the essence of the side

bar conference by stating:
The Court:

My mind is somewhat hazy on this, but I do
recall, especially with Mr. Weaver, of
course, there was somewhat of a discussion,
and that the State did object to you going
too far into it. And after the discussion
we concluded that the Court was of the
opinion that the examination by the defense
was going beyond the scope permitted.
That
the State stipulated to it, and I believe
stated that on the record, the State agreed
to it.
But with the understanding that if
you did go into it the door would be open,
and the State could also have the same
latitude.
That is my best recollection.

Mr. Bugden:

Thanks.

(T. 353)

(emphasis added).

This summary, accompanied by

counsel's acquiescence, demonstrates that appellant's counsel
stipulated to the broad questioning by the prosecutor of
defense witnesses who had been convicted of felonies.

The

accuracy of the lower court's summary is supported by the
actual conference and statement as the court recounted (T.
210).

The appellant cannot be heard to complain of the

parameters of the prosecutor's cross examination which was
stipulated to by counsel and the subject matter of which was
opened by appellant's counsel.
-35-
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In the circumstance where the defense counsel has
opened the matter, or in this case where defense counsel has
stipulated to the questioning, this Court has ruled that such
questioning is proper.
p,2d 1191

In State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 337, 489

(Utah 1971), this Court dealt with an allegation of

error in the questioning of the accused who appeared as a
witness in his own behalf.

The Court noted that defense

counsel had sought to portray the defendant as a person of
good character who had been harrassed by the police.
In doing so he brought out various
matters in which the defendant had been
accused of crime.
The defendant himself
having thus opened up the subject, it was
quite proper for the State to question
him on matters which might tend to
challenge, contradict or explain his
assertions on direct examination.
489 P.2d at 1193.

Similarly, where the appellant had opened

the subject by in-depth questioning of a State's witness and
stipulated to similar questioning of defense witnesses,
appellant's assertions are properly rejected.
However, should this Court recognize the
appellant's allegations, they must nevertheless be rejected as
failing to overcome the burden of proof required for reversal.
This Court, in State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229
(1936), provided an extensive examination of issues
surrounding the questioning of witnesses concerning prior
-36-
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felony convictions.

This examination resulted in several

guildelines for future litigants.

The Court held that:

(3) Questions whose only object could be
to call for answers to affect the
credibility of the witness and which
answers would tend to degrade his or her
character, but not tend to subject the
witness to punishment for a felony, are
permissible over a general objection as
to their relevancy or competency, in the
sound discretion of the court.
(5) The discretion referred to in rules 3
and 4 is to be exercised in view of the
varying circumstances of each particular
case and not limited by the intrinsic and
immediate considerations arising out of
the cross-examination.
64 P.2d at 238.

The Court noted further that with respect to

such questions if they were not excluded by the court, they
are always subject to exclusion by the witness.

While not

conceding that the prosecutor's questions were improper under
the totality of the circumstances, had they been improper, the
witness was free to exercise his privilege not to answer.

T~

appellant simply cannot show the degree of proof necessary to
overcome the discretionary ruling of the trial court to allow
the questions in view of the totality of the circumstances,
particularly where the scope of the questioning was

stipulat~

to by the appellant.
Questions concerning the robbery committed by the
witness were of particular importance to the credibility of
-37-
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the witness.

In states which have limited the impeachment of

witnesses through the use of prior felony convictions,
involving acts of dishonesty, robbery has been held to be a
crime of dishonesty admissible for impeachment purposes.
Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1980).
It should be remembered that in the present case,
unlike the cases referred to by the appellant, the questions
were asked of a witness who was not the defendant.

In this

state, where the details of felony convictions of the
defendant may be inquired into in unusual circumstances (State
v. Hansen, 448 P.2d 720, 721 (Utah 1968)), the appellant has
an even higher burden in showing prejudice resulting from such
questions posed to a witness who was not the accused.

The

appellant would have this Court believe that the result of the
prosecutor's cross examination of witness Miller was to
portray the appellant's witnesses as "bad guys."

However, it

should be noted that defense counsel's direct examination
established the witness' status as a prisoner.

Moreover,

defense counsel "opened the door" to this type of questioning
in his examination of weaver and attempting to make Weaver
appeal'." to be the "bad guy."
The appellant would also ask this Court to believe
that a decision in the State's favor would begin a period of
abuse which would result in the wholesale refusal of persons
-38-
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to appear as witnesses.

However, not every case involves the

unusual circumstance of defense counsel stipulating to and
opening the door to such questioning.

The parameters of

direct and cross examination would remain as they are under
the present law since a decision in favor of the State would
add nothing new.
POINT IV
REFERENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS
CLOSING ARGUMENT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THE VICTIM OF THE ROBBERY COULD HAVE BEEN
INJURED WAS WITHIN THE PROPER SCOPE OF
COMMENT WHERE THE JURY COULD PROPERLY
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY TO THE
VICTIM IN REACHING A VERDICT, AND ABSENT
THE COMMENT, THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN
THE SAME.
During the prosecutor's closing arguments he made
the comment:
Mr. Christensen:

[A] sk yourself whether or not this was
sufficient to justify an aggravated robbery
or a simple robbery, or for that matter a
crime of any kind.
Ask yourselves what you would have done
under that set of circumstances.
Bear in mind also up to what the impact
would have been had Mr. Cassins Clark
himself been injured, or other "bitches"
for victims.

(T. 361).

The appellant alleges error where reference was

made to the possibility of injury to Mr. Clark, the victim.
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such a reference was appropriate in a trial where the crime
charged was that of aggravated robbery by use of a knife or
facsimile of a knife.

The record is replete with references

to the possible use of knives or a gun in the commission of
the robbery.

The evidence suggests that the appellant had

possession of a knife only seconds before the robbery occurred
(T. 22, 277-278).

There is also testimony to suggest that the

existence of a gun was simulated in order to accomplish the
robbery (T. 25).

Moreover, Mr. Clark testified that something

resembling a short-barreled gun was pointed at him during the
course of the robbery (T. 80).

The abundance of evidence

concerning the use or apparent use of a deadly weapon in the
course of the robbery provided a sufficient basis for the
prosecutor's comment where a significant issue at trial was
whether the crime committed was aggravated robbery, requiring
the use of a deadly weapon or facsimile thereof, or simple
robbery, where no deadly weapon or facsimile is used (see
u.c.~

§

76-6-302 and

u.c.A.

§

76-6-301).

This Court has addressed the issue of alleged
impropriety in the closing arguments of counsel.

In State v.

Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P. 2d 442 ( 1973), this Court held
that:
Counsel for both sides have
considerable latitude in their arguments
-40-
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to the jury; they have the right to
discuss fully from their standpoints the
evidence and the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom.
The test
of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the
jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks.
513 P.2d at 426.

In the present case, the prosecutor

legitimately inferred from the evidence that some type of
weapon or facsimile of a deadly weapon was used in the
robbery.

Where such weapons are used in the course of a

robbery, concern for the safety of the victim is of primary
concern and forms the basis for the difference in the
penalties for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and
simple robbery, a second degree felony.

The prosecutor was

therefore wholly justified in calling the jurors'
the concern of potential injury to the victim.

attention~

However, even

if no such justification existed for the comment, it does not
merit reversal in the present case since the jury was in no
way influenced by the remark.

The jury apparently rejected

the prosecutor's view that a deadly weapon was used since it
convicted the appellant of only simple robbery (R. 110).
Therefore, even if this Court were to find error in the
comment, such error would constitute at most only harmless
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errnr, having no substantial effect upon the appellant's right
to a fair trial in that in the absence of the alleged error,
the result would have been the same.

See State v. Kazda,

Utah, 540 P.2d 949, 951 (1976), and Utah Code Annotated,
77-35-30.
In Elston v. State, 321 So.2d 267 (Ala. Crim. App.
1975), the prosecutor made a comment during closing arguments
almost identical to that made by the prosecutor in the present
case.

In that case, the prosecutor remarked "[I] submit to

you ladies and gentlemen of the court that we were lucky no
one was hurt in the robbery, and the next time that might not
be true."

321 So.2d at 266.

Of this argument, the court

stated:
This argument was reasonably calculated
to call the jury's attention to the
serious aspect of the robbery and to
appeal for law enforcement.
It was
within the realm of legitimate appeal to
the jury.
The court's ruling [denying
the motion for a mistrial], supra, was
not error.
321 So.2d at 266.

Likewise, in the present case, the trial

court's ruling that the comment was proper under the crime
charged was not error (T. 361).
Even though the appellant makes no showing that the
prosecutor's remark adversely influenced the jury, and in
actuality, no such showing can be made, the appellant must be
-42-
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held to this standard.

In State v. Galbraith, 559 P.2d 1089

(Ariz. App. 1977), the court held:

"Also, it should be noted

that the appellant has not made any showing that the remark in
any manner influenced the jury.

Such a showing would be

required before a reversal would be proper."

,559 P.2d at

1093.

The prosecutor's reference in the closing argument
to the possibility that the victim of the robbery could have
been injured was within the realm of proper comment under the
offense charged, and was an expression of his view of the
evidence.

Furthermore, the jury was justified in considering

such a possibility where the panel was required to decide
whether a deadly weapon or facsimile of a deadly weapon was
used in the perpetration of the crime.

Moreover, the verdict

that the appellant was guilty of simple robbery is evidence
that the comment in no way influenced the jury's decision.
Consequently, even if the comment was error, it was at most
harmless error since,

in view of the appellant's admission to

committing the crime, the result of the trial would have been
the same.
POINT V
REFERENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR TO THE FACT
THAT WITNESS WEAVER STILL HAD
APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS TO SERVE ON A
PREVIOUS CONVICTION WAS NOT IMPROPER AS
PROMULGATING A FALSE IMPRESSION WHERE THE
COMMENT WAS ACCURATE AND NO PROOF IS
PRESENTED SHOWING THE STATEMENT'S
INACCURACY AT THE TIME IT WAS MADE.
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On October 8, 1980, the State's chief witness in
the present case appeared before the Board of Pardons for a
parole violation hearing concerning charges which had been
dismissed (H.T. 2).

During the course of the hearing,

weaver's counsel, Mr. Steven Hansen, testified that the State
did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute the charges and
that since Weaver had cooperated with the State in appellant's
case and had served three months in the county jail in
protective custody, revocation of parole was inappropriate
(H.T. 3, 4).

Mr. Hansen also commented, in reliance upon

communications with prison officials, that Weaver's life would
be seriously jeopardized should he remain at the prison for an
extended period of time, that the earliest possible release
would be advisable (H.T. 4).

Prosecutor Christensen also

testified that Weaver had been the object of many threats
before and during the appellant's trial (H.T. 6).

Mr.

Christensen pointed out that Weaver was only peripherally
involved in the events that led to the charges forming the
basis for the revocation hearing (H.T. 9).

The emphasis of

the hearing then turned to Weaver's safety as a result of his
testimony against the appellant (H.T. 10, 11).

The Board

dismissed all charges against Weaver and placed him on parole
after testimony was heard concerning his familiar
responsibilities and employment prospects (H.T. 14).
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Appellant assails comments made by the prosecutor
to the effect that the witness Weaver still had two years to
serve on a previous conviction.

The comment was an attempt to

buttress the credibility of the witness' testimony as being
testimony against his own interests.

This remark was

appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case since
the appellant had vehemently at tacked the witness' credibility
during cross examination, direct examination, and during
closing arguments.

The propriety of this remark, which was

never objected to at trial,

is further supported by an

examination of defense counsel's closing argument to the jury,
Mr. Bugden:

Well, just how much time is Weaver doing? Mr.
Christensen doesn't remind you when he says that
he is doing his time that all he is doing is
time for one Class A Misdemeanor.
And what was
he charged with? He was charged with possessi~
a firearm, punishable by one to fifteen years in
the prison.
He was charged with possession, or
theft by receiving, punishable by one to fifteen
years in prison. But he is pleading guilty to a
Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by twelve
months.
Well, maybe he is doing some time, but hasn't he
gotten a pretty good deal? He is not going to
be charged with the robbery that he did.
He is
getting two felonies dismissed and he is only
going to do twelve months.
Don't do the crime unless you can do the time.
Weaver is not doing the time.
He got a great
deal.

(T. 18).

The above passage is only one of many similar

passages in which defense counsel attacked the credibility of
-45-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Weaver.

However, this particular passage is especially

illuminating when compared with the appellant's assertions on
appeal.

The remark assailed by the appellant is found in the

prosecutor's rebuttal to the closing arguments of defense
counsel.

Since the above-quoted passage is contained in

defense counsel's closing arguments, it can appropriately be
said that defense counsel "opened the door" to the
prosecutor's subsequent remark.

Where remarks by defense

counsel have "opened the door" or invited the remarks of the
prosecutor,

the comments of the prosecutor are not improper.

This Court, in State v. Boone, Utah, 581 P.2d 571 (1978),
acknowledged the validity of such a rule when it refused to
find reversible error in the remarks of the prosecutor
concerning the defendant's failure to testify.

The Court held

that the remarks were prompted by the comments of defense
counsel and merely emphasized one of the reasons suggested by
defense counsel for the defendant's failure to testify.
P.2d at 574.

581

Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court, in the

case of State v. Hannon, 451 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1969), held that
"The prosecutor was entitled to discuss the credibility of the
state's witnesses since the issue had been repeatedly raised
by defense counsel."

451 P.2d at 604.

In the present case, any comment by the prosecutor
concerning the credibility of weaver and the length of his
-46-
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remaining prison terms was a valid issue open to comment.
Defense counsel had raised the specific issue previous to the
remarks of the prosecutor, thereby foreclosing any complaint
of impropriety on appeal.

This, and the fact that no

contemporaneous objection was interposed at the time of the
comment, absolutely waive the issue for consideration on
appeal.

State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (1978).

Moreover, testimony at trial by numerous witnesses both for
the State and for the defense had established that Weaver wu
not liked at the prison and was the object of physical
assaults and threats because of his cooperation with the
police.
The appellant further asserts that because this
comment was made and Weaver has not in fact served two more
years in prison, the prosecutor purposely, and in bad faith,
misled the jurors to attach more credibility of Weaver's
testimony than they ordinarily would have absent the comment.
The appellant further asserts that at the time of the
argument, the prosecutor either knew or strongly

closi~

suspected~

would do everything he could to prevent Weaver from serving
more time at the prison.

A careful examination of the trial

record demonstrates the appellant's assertion to be
groundless. During the cross examination of Weaver on the
first day of trial, the following colloquy was recorded:
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By Mr. Bugden:

Q:

You indicated that there is presently a
commitment for you that results in your
being placed in the Utah State Prison,
is that right?

By Mr. Weaver:

A:

Yes,

Q:

What was that for?

A:

Possession of a handgun and theft by
receiving.

Q:

Now, those charges are still pending
against you?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Theft by receiving?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And that is a second-degree felony?

A:

Yes.

Q:

You are also presently charged with
possession of a firearm?

A:

Yes.

By Mr. Bugden:

Q:

Now, you've entered a plea negotiation
with the State; is that correct?

By Mr. Weaver:

A:

Yes.

Q:

You understand that in return for your
testimony, you are being given the opportunity to have charges dismissed against
you; is that correct?

A:

Just to be reduced.

Q:

well, if I understand what Mr. Christensen
has said, you are going to plead guilty to
one crime, Class A Misdemeanor?

A:

Yes.
-48-
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(T. at 48-49).

The above colloquy demonstrates that at the

time of the trial, including the closing argument, the only
arrangements made by way of plea negotiations for Weaver's
testimony were that he would plead guilty to one Class A
Misdemeanor instead of being charged and tried for three
felonies.

See also T. 36,37.

In the face of this direct

contradiction to the appellant's assertion, he offers no mo"
than speculation and conjecture about the prosecutor's
intention.

Such conjecture cannot form the basis of an issue

cognizable on appeal.

There simply is no evidence that the

prosecutor intended to testify at the parole revocation
hearing at the time the questioned remark was made during
closing arguments.
Moreover, even if the prosecutor at the time of his
closing argument intended to appear before the Board of
Pardons and speak in Weaver's behalf, the prosecutor had no
way of actually securing Weaver's release.

Utah Code

Annotated, Section 77-62-3 provides in pertinent part that:
(a} It shall be the duty of the board of
pardons to determine by majority
decision, when and under what conditions,
subject to the provisions of this act,
persons now or hereafter serving
sentences, in all cases except treason or
impeachments, in the penal or
correctional institutions of this state,
may be released upon parole, pardoned, or
may have their fines or forfeitures
-49-
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remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated; provided, no fine or
forfeiture shall be remitted, no parole
or pardon granted, or commutation or
sentence terminated, except after a full
hearing before said board.
under this statute, the Board of Pardons has exclusive
Jurisdiction to grant sentence terminations, and such
terminations may be granted only after a hearing has been held
before the Board.

In the present case, the testimony of the

prosecutor before the Board can be viewed as nothing more than
a recommendation.

Such recommendations are by no means

binding on the Board.

In this situation, the appellant is

hard-pressed to suggest that the Board decided in favor of
parole solely on the prosecutor's recommendation.

Even if the

Board's decision rested on the prosecutor's recommendation
alone, the appellant would still be required to show that the
prosecutor knew parole would be granted at the time of his
argument.

Such a showing is only a minimum requirement in

proving the appellant's assertion.

This requirement is not

conceded to be the only demonstration element of an alleged
improper argument or prejudicial comment.

Rather, the

appellant would be required to show much more before he could
prevail.
me~

However, not even the minimum requirement has been

in this case.
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-Furthermore, this issue raised by the appellant is
not appropriately before this Court.

The practice of

designating the record of proceedings occurring after the
trial and conviction, having nothing to do with the appellant,
is at best of questionable propriety.

However, even if the

record of witness Weaver's parole revocation hearing was
appropriately before this Court on appeal, any potential
remedy should have been explored in the lower court by any ooe
of a number of procedures.

Primarily, the appellant could

have filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §
77-35-24 (1981 Supp.).

If such a motion had been found to

~

inappropriate, appellant could have filed a petition for an
extraordinary writ of error coram nobis under Rule 65B(i),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Either of these alternative

remedies would have placed the matter before the district
court for decision and consequently preserved the issue for
appeal to this Court.

However, where the appellant has fail~

to utilize such remedies, the issue must be viewed as having
been waived.
The appellant refers to the case of Walker v.
State, No. 16705 (Utah, filed January 23, 1981) as supporting
his position.

In that case, the prosecutor was credited with

the knowledge of evidence, exculpatory to the defendant, as
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early as the second day of the trial; yet the prosecutor
thereafter produced two witnesses who testified to that which
was known to be incorrect.

Thereafter, the prosecutor

deliberately relied upon this incorrect testimony in his
closing argument to the jury.

In reaching its decision, this

court noted that the State's case against the defendant was
based on circumstantial evidence which would have been
contradicted by the new evidence brought to the attention of
the prosecutor during the second day of trial.
case bears no similarity to Walker.

The present

The prosecutor simply had

no way of knowing before the actual decision of the Board that
parole would have been granted.

Moreover, the case against

the appellant here was not circumstantial, particularly in
view of appellant's admission to committing the crime.

Simply

stated, the prosecutor could not have knowingly fostered the
false impression that Weaver had two more years to serve in
prison since at the time the comment was made the statement
was true.
This Court has addressed the issue of the propriety
of comments in closing arguments to the jury in State v.
Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973).

There the

Court concluded that:
The prosecutor in summing up his case
before the jury as well as defense
counsel has wide discretion and is
entitled to exercise considerable freedom
in expressing to the jury his view of the
evidence.
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514 P.2d at 533.

Correspondingly, any ruling made by the

trial court on an objection interposed to a comment made
during the closing argument can be disturbed only where it is
shown that the trial court's discretion has been abused.
People v. Alvarez, Colo., 530 P.2d 506, 507 (1975).
The appellant has failed at every turn to

overco~

his burden of proving an abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court.

He asserts that the prosecutor created a

false impression in the minds of the jurors when the comment
which created this allegedly false impression was absolutely
true.

This Court simply cannot consider such groundless

allegations of error since the entire issue has not been
preserved for review.
POINT VI
IN VIEW OF THE TOTALITY OF THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT, ANY
ALLEGED ERROR, OR THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT
OF SUCH ALLEGED ERRORS, WAS HARMLESS.
The appellant alleges that errors committed by

~e

prosecutor continued throughout the trial, relying on his
previous allegations of error.

He asserts that the result of

these alleged errors was a denial of his right to a fair
trial.

This Court has addressed the issue of fair trial unde

circumstances similar to the present case.

In State v.
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if

:Jer

Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), this Court was
asked to evaluate the prejudicial effects of a question asked
by the prosecutor of the defendant.

Counsel for the defendant

objected to the question and the trial court sustained the
objection.

On appeal, the defendant asserted that the error

was so grievous as to be incurable, and deprived the defendant
of a fair trial.

The Court observed that:

Nevertheless, the processes of justice
should not be distorted simply for the
purpose of censuring a mistake. The
critical inquiry should be whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the
incident so prejudiced the jury that in
its absence there might have been a
different result.
517 P.2d at 1324.
court,

The Court noted further that the trial

in ruling on a motion for a mistrial, should view such

episodes in light of the total proceeding to determine whether
there had been such prejudice as would deprive the defendant
of an impartial determination of guilt.
Here,

517 P.2d at 1324.

in view of the totality of the proceedings in the trial

court, the admission of guilt by the appellant, the taperecorded telephone conversation confirming the appellant's
initiation of the idea to commit the robbery, and the victim's
identification of the appellant as one of the robbers, any
alleged error must have been harmless.
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Also, in Hodges, this Court noted that it was
conceivable that reversible error could result from suggestion
or innuendo, but declined to recognize such a situation since
that recognition would eliminate the need or incentive for a
trial court to rule correctly on objections . . This case does
not present the circumstance postulated by the Court in Hodges
and therefore provides no reason for accepting appellant's
allegations.
Important to note also is the fact that this Court
in Hodges recognized that:
In the absence of the appearance of
something persuasive to the contrary, we
assume that the jurors were conscientious
in performing to [sic] their duty, and
that they followed the instructions of
the court.
517 P.2d at 1324.

The importance of this presumption in the

present case lies in the fact that the trial court admonis~d
the jury that the arguments of counsel were not evidence (T.
357).

The court later instructed the jury on the admission o~

evidence and questions to which objections were sustained (R.
90).

The court also instructed that the jury was the finder

of fact and as such was the exclusive judge of the credibili~
of witnesses and weight of the evidence (R. 93-94).

The court

further instructed the jury that the fact that a witness h~
been convicted of a felony could be considered only in judgi~
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the credibility of a witness and that such a conviction did
not necessarily impair or destroy credibility (R. 96).
In view of the entire record of the trial below, if
this Court observes any error, it must be disregarded.

Rule

61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to
the court to be inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
See also Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In the present case, an analysis of the record of
the proceedings of the court below fails to reveal any
prejudicial error in the absence of which the result of the
trial would have been different.
CONCLUSION
The appellant suffered no prejudice from any remark
made by the prosecutor in either his opening statement or
closing argument.

In the case of the remark made by the

prosecutor in his opening statement about the statement signed
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by Weaver exculpating the appellant from criminal
responsibility, the remark was proper as part of the outline
of Weaver's testimony.

On direct examination, Weaver did in

fact testify to the incident.

Moreover, since no

contemporaneous objection was interposed by the appellant to
the remark, the appellant has waived consideration of the
issue on appeal.
Appellant's allegation that the trial court
erroneously denied his motion to withdraw in order to be
called as a witness, and to call the prosecutor as a defense
witness, lacks the explanation that is supplied by the
transcript of the proceedings.

Where counsel's motion to

withdraw was predicated upon his anticipated appearance as a
witness, and counsel himself decided not to become a witness,
the question was rendered moot by counsel's own decision.
Moreover, there was no need for either defense counsel or the
prosecutor to become witnesses where the opening remark lacked
any implication of unethical conduct by defense counsel, and
any evidence surrounding the signing of the statement could
have been obtained from a number of other persons.
The reference by the prosecutor during his closing
argument to the possibility of injury to the victim was
in light of the offense charged, aggravated robbery.

pr~~

It is

exactly the possibility of injury by use of a deadly weapon
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that differentiates aggravated robbery from simple robbery,
making the former a more serious offense.

In view of the fact

that weapons were used, or at least had been obtained for use
in the robbery, the prosecutor was properly commenting
according to his view of the case.

However, even if the

comment had been improper, the appellant makes no
demonstration of prejudice resulting from the remark.

In

fact, no prejudice did result from the comment since the jury
obviously rejected the prosecutor's view and convicted the
appellant of simple robbery.
Further comment during closing argument by the
prosecutor concerning witness Weaver's remaining two-year
prison term was likewise proper.

Simply stated, the comment

could not have fostered any prejudicial false impression
since, at the time of the argument, the comment was true.

The

prosecutor had no way of knowing or guaranteeing that Weaver
would be released one month later.

The appel1ant has not

demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the comment.
Similarly, even if appellant's allegations of error
were well founded, each error was harmless in view of the
totality of the evidence and proceedings.

The appellant

simply has not shown that a fair trial was not conducted.
Where the court's admonitions and instructions to the jury are
presumed to have been followed, appellant's right to a fair
trial was scrupulously protected.
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DATED this 3rd day of November, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON

Atw;;;f1r~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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